David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 183 (S1):87-109 (2011)
I present a game-theoretical multi-agent system to simulate the evolutionary process responsible for the pragmatic phenomenon division of pragmatic labour (DOPL), a linguistic convention emerging from evolutionary forces. Each agent is positioned on a toroid lattice and communicates via signaling games , where the choice of an interlocutor depends on the Manhattan distance between them. In this framework I compare two learning dynamics: reinforcement learning (RL) and belief learning (BL). An agent’s experiences from previous plays influence his communication behaviour, and RL agents act in a non-rational way whereas BL agents display a small degree of rationality by using best response dynamics . The complete system simulates an evolutionary process of communication strategies, which agents can learn in a structured spatial society. The significant questions are: what circumstances could lead to an evolutionary process that doesn’t result in the expected DOPL convention; and to what extent is interlocutor rationality necessary for the emergence of a society-wide convention à la DOPL?
|Keywords||Multi-agent system Division of pragmatic labour Signaling games Learning dynamics Communication strategies Simulation of an evolutionary process|
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1969). Convention: A Philosophical Study. Harvard University Press.
Brian Skyrms (2010). Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information. Oxford University Press.
Stephen C. Levinson (2000). Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature. MIT Press.
Kevin J. S. Zollman (2005). Talking to Neighbors: The Evolution of Regional Meaning. Philosophy of Science 72 (1):69-85.
Jeffrey Barrett & Kevin J. S. Zollman, The Role of Forgetting in the Evolution and Learning of Language.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Franke & Gerhard Jäger (2012). Bidirectional Optimization From Reasoning and Learning in Games. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21 (1):117-139.
Michael Franke (2013). Pragmatic Reasoning About Unawareness. Erkenntnis 79 (S4):1-39.
Michael Franke (2013). Game Theoretic Pragmatics. Philosophy Compass 8 (3):269-284.
Michael Franke (2016). The Evolution of Compositionality in Signaling Games. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 25 (3-4):355-377.
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