Cross-World Comparatives for Modal Realists


Authors
Robert Michels
Università Della Svizzera Italiana
Abstract
Divers (2014) argues that a Lewisian theory of modality which includes both counterpart theory and modal realism cannot account for the truth of certain intuitively true modal sentences involving cross-world comparatives. The main purpose of this paper is to defend the Lewisian theory against Divers’s challenge by developing a response strategy based on a degree-theoretic treatment of comparatives and by showing that this treatment is compatible with the theory.
Keywords comparatives  counterpart theory  David Lewis  John Divers  modal realism  modality
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
On the Plurality of Worlds.Allen Stairs - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):333-352.
Counterfactuals. [REVIEW]William Parry - 1973 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (2):278-281.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-09-22

Total views
46 ( #192,927 of 2,285,595 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #55,864 of 2,285,595 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature