Abstract
In philosophy of mind, the arguments about phenomenal experience are related to ontological points of view in which the alternatives are physicalist monism and dualism. Both involve problems and the choice is difficult in order to describe the experience into scientific knowledge. I accost Carnap and Vasubandhu philosophies to show an epistemic position, that involves an ontological deconstruction, from the phenomenal experience starting point. In this view, the way to address the psico-physical problem changes: it is not concerned any problem about a dualism of substances. Experience and evidence are two points of convergence, and lead to the question of subjectivity: the consciousness it is not an object however it keeps its relevance.
Keywords Buddeist philosophy  consciousness  ontology  phenomenal experience  philosophy of mind
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Reprint years 2012, 2013
DOI 10.13128/annali_dip_filos-13566
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