Cognitive Penetrability of Social Perception: A Case for Emotion Recognition

Francesco Marchi
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Adams & Kveraga argue that social visual perception is cognitively penetrable by extending a top-down model for visual object recognition to visual perception of social cues. Here I suggest that, in their view, a clear link between the top-down contextual influences that modulate social visual perception and the perceptual experience of a subject is missing. Without such a link their proposal is consistent with explanations that need not involve cognitive penetration of perceptual experience but only modifications of perceptual judgments formed on the basis of that experience. I review two experiments that may provide initial evidence for the link and discuss why we can best explain the results with cognitive penetration, compared to modification of judgment. Finally, I show that the compound social-cue integration theory A. & K. propose fits naturally with the cases I discuss
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DOI 10.1007/s13164-015-0258-z
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