Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):224-256 (2019)

Authors
Kristin M. Mickelson
University of Minnesota, Morris
Abstract
How is the problem of free will related to the problem of moral luck? In this essay, I answer that question and outline a new solution to the paradox of moral luck, the source-paradox solution. This solution both explains why the paradox arises and why moral luck does not exist. To make my case, I highlight a few key connections between the paradox of moral luck and two related problems, namely the problem of free will and determinism and the paradox of self-creation. Piecing together intuitions, arguments, and insights from recent work on each of these three problems, I argue that the type of control necessary for moral responsibility can only be satisfied by someone who is a genuine source of his own actions, but the relevant notion of sourcehood admits no coherent characterization. If our commonsense view of moral responsibility is incoherent, it is unsurprising that our commitment to the existence of morally responsible agents commits us to some paradoxical things—e.g. to both the existence and impossibility of moral luck.
Keywords Free Will  Determinism  Constitutive Luck  Correlation Problem  Explanation Problem  Moral Luck  Causal Luck  Circumstantial Luck  manipulation argument  Basic Argument
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DOI 10.1111/misp.12114
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Free Agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.

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Citations of this work BETA

(In)Compatibilism.Kristin M. Mickelson - forthcoming - In Joseph Campbell (ed.), Companion to Free Will. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.

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