JFGI: From distributed cognition to distributed reliabilism

Philosophical Issues 24 (1):314-346 (2014)
Abstract
While, prima facie, virtue/credit approaches in epistemology would appear to be in tension with distributed/extended approaches in cognitive science, Pritchard () has recently argued that the tension here is only apparent, at least given a weak version of distributed cognition, which claims merely that external resources often make critical contributions to the formation of true belief, and a weak virtue theory, which claims merely that, whenever a subject achieves knowledge, his cognitive agency makes a significant contribution to the formation of a true belief. But the significance of the role played by the subject's cognitive agency in distributed cognitive systems is in fact highly variable: at one extreme, formation of a true belief seems clearly to be significantly creditable to the subject's agency; at the other extreme, however, the subject's agency plays such a peripheral role that it is at best unclear whether it should receive significant credit for formation of a true belief. The compatibility of distributed cognition and virtue epistemology thus turns on what it takes for a contribution to the formation of true belief to count as significant. This article argues that the inevitable vagueness of this notion suggests retreating from virtue epistemology to a form of process reliabilism and explores the prospects for a distributed reliabilist epistemology designed to fit smoothly with distributed cognition. In effect, distributed reliabilism radicalizes Goldberg's recent extended reliabilist view by allowing the process the reliability of which determines the epistemic status of a subject's belief to extend to include not only processing performed by other subjects but also processing performed by non-human technological resources
Keywords distributed cognition  extended cognition  extended mind  memory  theories of memory  epistemology of memory  social epistemology  testimony
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DOI 10.1111/phis.12036
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.

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Citations of this work BETA
Immaterial Engagement: Human Agency and the Cognitive Ecology of the Internet.Robert W. Clowes - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
Social Machines: A Philosophical Engineering.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (5):953-978.

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