History and Philosophy of Logic 6 (1):191-209 (1985)
In Science without numbers Hartry Field attempted to formulate a nominalist version of Newtonian physics?one free of ontic commitment to numbers, functions or sets?sufficiently strong to have the standard platonist version as a conservative extension. However, when uses for abstract entities kept popping up like hydra heads, Field enriched his logic to avoid them. This paper reviews some of Field's attempts to deflate his ontology by inflating his logic
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism.Nelson Goodman & W. V. Quine - 1947 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):105-122.
Citations of this work BETA
Intrinsic Explanation and Field's Dispensabilist Strategy.Russell Marcus - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (2):163-183.
The Roots of Contemporary Platonism.Penelope Maddy - 1989 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (4):1121-1144.
Similar books and articles
Some Objections to Putnam's “Consistency Objection”.John A. Humphrey - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Research 18:127-141.
How Nominalist is Hartry Field's Nominalism?Michael D. Resnik - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (2):163 - 181.
Is There a Good Epistemological Argument Against Platonism?David Liggins - 2006 - Analysis 66 (290):135–141.
New Directions for Nominalist Philosophers of Mathematics.Charles Chihara - 2010 - Synthese 176 (2):153 - 175.
Extending Hartry Field's Instrumental Account of Applied Mathematics to Statistical Mechanics.Glen Meyer - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 17 (3):273-312.
Added to index2010-08-10
Total downloads50 ( #105,808 of 2,178,143 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #73,247 of 2,178,143 )
How can I increase my downloads?