Philosophy of Science 34 (1):18-22 (1967)

Abstract
The postulates of rational preference suggested by Von Neumann and Morgenstern have been defended as descriptive or empirical generalizations and as normative principles. It is argued that the postulates are inaccurate empirical generalizations and unacceptable normative principles
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DOI 10.1086/288119
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Cost-Benefit Versus Expected Utility Acceptance Rules.Alex C. Michalos - 1970 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970 (1):375-402.

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