The Humphrey Objection and the Problem of De Re Modality
In this paper I consider Saul Kripke’s famous Humphrey objection to David Lewis’s views on de re modality and argue that responses to this objection currently on the market fail to mitigate its force in any significant way.
|Keywords||David Lewis Modality Humphrey Objection De Re Modality Counterpart Theory|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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