Peirce's epistemology and its Kantian legacy: Exegetic and systematic considerations

Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (4):577-601 (2007)
: This paper considers Peirce's epistemology against the background of its Kantian legacy. While various interpreters like R. Rorty, K.-O. Apel and J. Habermas have claimed that Peirce remained a Kantian philosopher, the thesis defended here is that Peirce rejected several of Kant's epistemological dichotomies, such as the transcendental-empirical and the a priori-a posteriori dichotomy. In particular, the paper considers an epistemological project which has been largely neglected in the literature: Peirce's semiotic analysis of assertions. This analysis reconstructs various sign forms as elements of assertions and as pre-theoretic conditions for formal logic and for scientific inquiry. The paper shows how this analysis bears on modern philosophical research on indexicals, and also on pragmatically oriented philosophy of language more generally
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2007.0092
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Gabriele Gava (2011). Peirce's 'Prescision' as a Transcendental Method. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (2):231 - 253.

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