Empirismo, conocimiento previo e inducción en Aristóteles, an. post. A 1

Abstract

I reconstruct Aristotle’s epistemology and scientific methodology avoiding some problems which, in my opinion, are attributed to them from inadequate interpretations in terms of foundationalism or coherentism. On the contrary, I credit Aristotle with a hybrid concept of empiricism in which our knowledge is made possible through the integration of two different but cooperative factors: observations and beliefs. By clarifying the implications of Aristotle’s concept of experience and the basis for the elaboration of scientific knowledge, I try to give an alternative account of Aristotle’s vindication of a positive use of dialectic in science, as well as to show that an integration between dialectical examination of beliefs and scientific analysis of facts is possible and it also gives a plausible methodological image of Aristotle’s theory. According to my proposal, some opinions play a conceptual role in the empirical basis of knowledge. But, for Aristotle, this does not amount to any more than a kind of knowledge of the facts, not being equivalent to a scientific knowledge of the causes. Finally, I try to show that within this complex epistemological framework Aristotle’s use of induction could also be given an adequate explanation.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,856

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-18

Downloads
9 (#959,288)

6 months
1 (#386,040)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Similar books and articles

Aristóteles: inducción y ética.Gil Lugo Wolfgang - 1992 - Apuntes Filosóficos 1 (1).
Empirismo y búsqueda de conocimiento.D. Shapere - 1982 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):5-26.
Wittgenstein, McDowell y el reto escéptico.María Teresa Muñoz Sánchez - 2013 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 38 (2):7-34.
La estructura del conocimiento práctico.César Lorenzano - 2004 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 29 (2):21-41.
Percepción sensorial y teoría del conocimiento en Aristóteles.Jesús Araiza - 2009 - Revista de Filosofía (México) 41 (126):33-43.
Fenómenos y creencias en Aristóteles. Una interpretación sobre el rol metodológico de las éndoxa en la ciencia natural.Fabián Mié - 2013 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 46:211-234.