Acta Analytica 26 (1):75-93 (2011)
The paper defends a neo-Lockean view of secondary qualities, in particular color, according to which the being of a given color amounts to having the disposition to produce in normal viewers under normal circumstances the response of seeing an objective manifest simple color. It also defends the view that the naïve color-concept, the simple color concept, so to speak, is a fully objective property. The defense of this view is carried against its nearest cousin , the view proposed and defended by Philip Pettit and Frank Jackson, according to which the naive color concept is response dependent, whereas color itself is fully objective. It is argued that the neo-Lockean alternative better captures the phenomenology of color, and better predicts or accounts for the dramatic character of the historical scientific discoveries (of Newton and his followers). Against metaphysical response dependence, the paper proposes a brief positive argument from the unity of color properties, and a criticism of Jackson’s counter-argument against metaphysical response-dependence from the naïve intuitions about causal properties of color
|Keywords||Color Response-dependence Manifest image Secondary qualities|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Perception and the Fall From Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.
Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves.Rae Langton - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour.Barry G. Stroud - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Physicalist and Dispositionalist Views on Colour: A Physiological Objection.Andraž Stožer & Janez Bregant - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (1):73-93.
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