In Defence of the Phenomenological Objection to Mental Fictionalism

Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 27 (2):169-186 (2020)
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Abstract

In this paper, we defend the main claims of our earlier paper “Mental Fictionalism as an Undermotivated Theory” (in The Monist) from Gábor Bács’s criticism, which appeared in his “Mental fictionalism and epiphenomenal qualia” (in Dialectica). In our earlier paper, we tried to show that mental fictionalism is an undermotivated the-ory, so there is no good reason to give up the realist approach to the folk psychological discourse. The core of Bács’s criticism consists in that our argumentation rests on an equivocation concerning the folk psychological concepts of conscious experiences. In our present argumentation, at first, we shortly recapitulate our earlier argumentation and Bács’s main objection to it. After that, we argue against the case of equivocation, claiming that it rests on a highly implausible and unsupported verificationist approach. Lastly, in answering another remark of Bács’s, we discuss the possibility of a realist mental fic-tionalism and conclude that it is an incoherent standpoint.

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Author Profiles

Miklós Márton
Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences
János Tőzsér
Research Centre for The Humanities, Budapest, Hungary

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References found in this work

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Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Inverted earth.Ned Block - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.

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