Limits of Computational Explanation of Cognition

In Vincent Müller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 69-84 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this chapter, I argue that some aspects of cognitive phenomena cannot be explained computationally. In the first part, I sketch a mechanistic account of computational explanation that spans multiple levels of organization of cognitive systems. In the second part, I turn my attention to what cannot be explained about cognitive systems in this way. I argue that information-processing mechanisms are indispensable in explanations of cognitive phenomena, and this vindicates the computational explanation of cognition. At the same time, it has to be supplemented with other explanations to make the mechanistic explanation complete, and that naturally leads to explanatory pluralism in cognitive science. The price to pay for pluralism, however, is the abandonment of the traditional autonomy thesis asserting that cognition is independent of implementation details.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,745

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-10-24

Downloads
38 (#116,676)

6 months
38 (#406,104)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Marcin Miłkowski
Polish Academy of Sciences

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references