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Why think that the brain is not a computer?
APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 16 (2):22-28 (2016)
Abstract
In this paper, I review the objections against the claim that brains are computers, or, to be precise, information-processing mechanisms. By showing that practically all the popular objections are either based on uncharitable interpretation of the claim, or simply wrong, I argue that the claim is likely to be true, relevant to contemporary cognitive (neuro)science, and non-trivial.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Moralische Roboter: Humanistisch-philosophische Grundlagen und didaktische Anwendungen.André Schmiljun & Iga Maria Schmiljun - 2024 - transcript Verlag.
References found in this work
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem.Alan Turing - 1936 - Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 42 (1):230-265.
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