Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):123 – 125 (2003)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
In 'Axiological Actualism' Josh Parsons argues that 'axiological actualism', which is 'the doctrine that ethical theory should refrain from assigning levels of welfare, or preference orderings, or anything of the sort to merely possible people', lends plausibility to 'the converse intuition'. This is the proposition that 'the welfare a person would have, were they actual, can give us a reason not to bring that person into existence'. I show that Parsons's argument delivers less than he promises. It could be convincing only to actualists who hold certain views about normative ethics, and could at most convince them to heed the converse intuition only under certain circumstances.
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
ISBN(s) | |
DOI | 10.1093/ajp/jag111 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Eliminating “Converse” From Converse PDL.Giuseppe Giacomo - 1996 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 5 (2):193-208.
Converse Relations, Vectors, And Three Theses From Armstrong.Andrew Newman - 2002 - Metaphysica 3 (2).
Actualism, Ontological Commitment, and Possible World Semantics.Christopher Menzel - 1990 - Synthese 85 (3):355 - 389.
Why the Converse Consequence Condition Cannot Be Accepted.Luca Moretti - 2003 - Analysis 63 (4):297–300.
The Importance of Being Actual: Some Reasons for and Against Procreation.Paul Sludds - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):561 – 568.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
37 ( #278,604 of 2,419,798 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #542,712 of 2,419,798 )
2009-01-28
Total views
37 ( #278,604 of 2,419,798 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #542,712 of 2,419,798 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads