Assessor Relative Conativism

Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (1):96-115 (2024)
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According to conventionalist or conativist views about personal-identity, utterances of personal-identity sentences express propositions that are, in part, made true by the conative attitudes of relevant persons-stages. In this paper I introduce assessor relative conativism: the view that a personal-identity proposition can be true when evaluated at one person-stage's context and false when evaluated at another person-stage's context, because person-stages have different patterns of conative attitudes. I present several reasons to embrace assessor relative conativism over its more familiar realizer relative cousin.

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Kristie Miller
University of Sydney

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References found in this work

Self-made People.David Mark Kovacs - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1071-1099.
Diachronic Self-Making.David Mark Kovacs - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):349-362.
How to Be a Conventional Person.Kristie Miller - 2004 - The Monist 87 (4):457-474.
Community-Made Selves.Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):459-470.
Surviving, to some degree.David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3805-3831.

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