Are There Degrees of Self-Consciousness?

Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (3-4):252-282 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX


It is widely assumed that ordinary conscious experience involves some form of sense of self or consciousness of oneself. Moreover, this claim is often restricted to a ‘thin’ or ‘minimal’ notion of self-consciousness, or even ‘the simplest form of self-consciousness’, as opposed to more sophisticated forms of self-consciousness which are not deemed ubiquitous in ordinary experience. These formulations suggest that self-consciousness comes in degrees, and that individual subjects may differ with respect to the degree of self-consciousness they exhibit at a given time. In this article, I critically examine this assumption. I consider what the claim that self-consciousness comes in degrees may mean, raise some challenges against the different versions of the claim, and conclude that none of them is both coherent and particularly plausible.



External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Are There Degreess of Self-Consciousness?R. Milliere - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (3-4):252-282.
Degrees of Consciousness.Andrew Y. Lee - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):553-575.
The Sensory Deprivation Tank – A Time Machine.Matthew T. Phillips - 2022 - Anthropology of Consciousness 33 (1):63-78.
Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought.Tim Crane - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford, UK: Oup Usa. pp. 156.
Fringe consciousness and the multifariousness of emotions.Ronald B. de Sousa - 2002 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8.
The Varieties of Selflessness.Raphael Milliere - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-41.
Consciousness and self-consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - The Monist 87 (2):182-205.
Control Consciousness.Pete Mandik - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):643-657.
Does sentience come in degrees?Andrew Y. Lee - 2020 - Animal Sentience 29 (20).
Phenomenal consciousness and intentionality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.


Added to PP

203 (#101,689)

6 months
93 (#53,442)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Raphaël Millière
Macquarie University

Citations of this work

Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.
Disorientation and self-consciousness: a phenomenological inquiry.Pablo Fernández Velasco - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (1):203-222.
The self and conscious experience.Giorgio Marchetti - 2024 - Frontiers in Psychology 15 (1340943):1-15.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references