Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology as Religious Epistemology: A Response to Bobier

Philosophia 43 (2):427-434 (2015)
Abstract
In a recent paper, Christopher Bobier has argued that Duncan Pritchard’s Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology cannot account for knowledge that we have through Divine Revelation. This gives philosophers who believe that Divine Revelation can be source of knowledge reason to reject ALVE. Bobier’s arguments are specifically against ALVE, but they serve as arguments against all sorts of virtue epistemologies. In this paper then, I will critically examine Bobier’s argument, and contend that virtue epistemologies are compatible with knowledge through Divine Revelation
Keywords Anti-luck virtue epistemology  Religious epistemology  Divine revelation
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-015-9592-8
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References found in this work BETA
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.
Knowledge and Credit.Jennifer Lackey - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.
Safety-Based Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:33-45.

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