Can Perceptual Experiences Be Rational?

Mind 127 (505):251-263 (2018)
Authors
Alan Millar
University of Stirling
Abstract
© Millar 2018This bold, provocative, and highly original book is in three Parts. Part I outlines a problem, sketches a solution, and defends a claim that is crucial to the solution—that ‘perceptual experiences and the processes by which they arise can be rational or irrational’. This claim is The Rationality of Perception. In Part II Siegel argues that the power of experiences to justify beliefs can be downgraded or upgraded by psychological precursors. Part III applies, and further develops, the theoretical framework that has been outlined in the previous parts. The topics addressed there include fearful and wishful seeing, and selection effects as they bear on the character of experiences. The last chapter concerns the appraisal of culturally appropriated racial attitudes that can influence beliefs and, on Siegel’s view, visual experiences as well. The discussion throughout takes readers well off the beaten track and is to...
Keywords perceptual experience  cognitive penetration
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzx035
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References found in this work BETA

Which Properties Are Represented in Perception?Susanna Siegel - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481--503.
Rich or Thin?Susanna Siegel & Alex Byrne - 2017 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. New York, USA: Routledge.
Reasons and Experience.Christopher S. Hill & Alan Millar - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (2):279.

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