Can Subjects Be Proper Parts of Subjects? The De‐Combination Problem

Ratio 31 (2):137-154 (2018)

Authors
Gregory Miller
University of Liverpool
Abstract
Growing concern with the panpsychist's ostensive inability to solve the ‘combination problem’ has led some authors to adopt a view titled ‘Cosmopsychism’. This position turns panpsychism on its head: rather than many tiny atomic minds, there is instead one cosmos-sized mind. It is supposed that this view voids the combination problem, however I argue that it does not. I argue that there is a ‘de-combination problem’ facing the cosmopsychist, which is equivalent to the combination problem as they are both concerned with subjects being proper parts of other subjects. I then propose two methods for both theorists to avoid the problem of subject-subject proper parthood relations: a distinction between absolute and relative phenomenal unity, and a modification of the essential nature of subjects. Of these two options, I find the latter option wanting and propose that the first should be adopted.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1111/rati.12166
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.
The Combination Problem for Panpsychism.David Chalmers - 2016 - In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Beyond Combination: How Cosmic Consciousness Grounds Ordinary Experience.Itay Shani & Joachim Keppler - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (3):390-410.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Free Will and Subject.John Shand - 2015 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):51-70.
Aristotle on Substance and Unity.Hye-Kyung Kim - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 10:79-91.
Aristotle on Substance and Unity.Hye-Kyung Kim - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 10:79-91.
Existential Phenomenology and the Conceptual Problem of Other Minds.Christian Skirke - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):227-249.
From Phenomenal Selves to Hyperselves.Barry Dainton - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:161-197.
Why is Coerced Consent Worse Than No Consent and Deceived Consent?David Wendler & Alan Wertheimer - 2017 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 42 (2):114-131.
Self-Identity Theory and Research Methods.Mardi J. Horowitz - 2012 - Journal of Research Practice 8 (2):Article - M14.
Does Panexperiential Holism Solve the Combination Problem?Ludwig Jaskolla & Alexander J. Buck - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):9-10.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-05-03

Total views
86 ( #94,792 of 2,266,272 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #30,554 of 2,266,272 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature