Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:121-143 (2019)

Michael Milona
Ryerson University
Mark Schroeder
University of Southern California
According to the thesis of the guise of the normative, all desires are associated with normative appearances or judgments. But guise of the normative theories differ sharply over the content of the normative representation, with the two main versions being the guise of reasons and the guise of the good. Chapter 6 defends the comparative thesis that the guise of reasons thesis is more promising than the guise of the good. The central idea is that observations from the theory of content determination can be used in order to constrain possible theories of the representational contents associated with desire. The authors argue that the initially most promising versions of the guise of the good fail to meet these constraints, and then explain the steep challenge confronting any who wish to craft a new guise of the good theory which meets the constraints while also preserving the initial motivations for adopting any guise of the normative theory at all. But a simple version of the guise of reasons not only avoids the troubles besetting the guise of the good but proceeds immediately from a deep diagnosis of the source of its difficulties.
Keywords desire, perception, content, reasons, good, guise of the good
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DOI 10.1093/oso/9780198841449.003.0006
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A Perceptual Theory of Hope.Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
The Goals of Moral Worth.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
The fundamental reason for reasons fundamentalism.Mark Schroeder - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3107-3127.
The Guise of Good Reason.Ulf Hlobil - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):204-224.

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