Mind 116 (464):1079-1082 (2007)
Professor Tennant and I agree on much regarding the proof-theoretic semantics of free logic. Here I point to two issues, one on which we disagree, the other on which I find it hard to say how closely we may agree. The first concerns the exact content of Tennant's Rule of Atomic Denotation. The second concerns the nature of assumptions whose formal counterparts contain parametric occurrences of names
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