Endurantism, diachronic vagueness and the problem of the many

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):242–253 (2008)
A plausible desideratum for an account of the nature of objects, at, and across time, is that it accommodate the phenomenon of vagueness without locating vagueness in the world. A series of arguments have attempted to show that while universalist perdurantism – which combines a perdurantist account of persistence with an unrestricted mereological account of composition – meets this desideratum, endurantist accounts do not. If endurantists reject unrestricted composition then they must hold that vagueness is ontological. But if they embrace unrestricted composition they are faced with the problem of the many, and cannot plausibly accommodate vagueness. This paper disambiguates two related sub-problems of the problem of the many, and argues that universalist perdurantism is not superior to universalist endurantism with respect to either of these.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00318.x
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References found in this work BETA
Theodore Sider (2003). Against Vague Existence. Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):135 - 146.
Achille C. Varzi (2003). Perdurantism, Universalism, and Quantifiers. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):208-215.
E. J. Lowe (2005). Vagueness and Endurance. Analysis 65 (286):104–112.
Kristie Miller (2006). Non-Mereological Universalism. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):404–422.

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