Frege's Puzzle for Perception

Abstract
According to an influential variety of the representational view of perceptual experience—the singular content view—the contents of perceptual experiences include singular propositions partly composed of the particular physical object a given experience is about or of. The singular content view faces well-known difficulties accommodating hallucinations; I maintain that there is also an analogue of Frege's puzzle that poses a significant problem for this view. In fact, I believe that this puzzle presents difficulties for the theory that are unique to perception in that strategies that have been developed to respond to Frege's puzzle in the case of belief cannot be employed successfully in the case of perception. Ultimately, I maintain that this perceptual analogue of Frege's puzzle provides a compelling reason to reject the singular content view of perceptual experience.
Keywords Perceptual Experience  Perceptual Content  Singular Content  Content View  Frege's Puzzle
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DOI 10.1111/phpr.12230
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Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
The Character of Consciousness.David John Chalmers - 2010 - Oxford University Press.

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