Abstract

In his epistemological system Mead begins with that which the chief philosophers rejected, the novel or exceptional, and makes it central. It is central in a respect which should be carefully explained. The novel or emergent is that with reference to which a present is defined, and a present is the seat of reality. In saying this Mead does not mean that “the past” and “the future” are meaningless terms. Nor does he reduce them to a present. Rather he holds that neither the past nor the future exists. In fact, they are meaningful only in relation to a present and the various pasts and futures referred to in our statement of causal conditions and predictions belong to a present, which is their seat. Mead escapes the metaphysical problem as to whether the past or the future has some sort of being even now. Certainly in so far as he has a metaphysics at all it derives from his epistemology which is primary and represents a pioneering attempt to develop a theory of knowledge answering to experimental science. Consciously or unconsciously most contemporary scientists are still under the influence of bygone epistemological and metaphysical doctrines in their explicit statements of what constitutes reality and knowing. Yet in so far as they are successful in practice obviously they are free from the blind alleys and dead ends which these older theories lead to logically. However no one, not even the philosopher, has been able to formulate a consistent set of epistemological principles from which experimental scientific procedure follows logically. One thing, Mead contends, has been wholly neglected. It is the emergent.