Mind 118 (471):647-712 (2009)

Authors
Peter Millican
Oxford University
Abstract
The ‘New Hume’ interpretation, which sees Hume as a realist about ‘thick’ Causal powers, has been largely motivated by his evident commitment to causal language and causal science. In this, however, it is fundamentally misguided, failing to recognise how Hume exploits his anti-realist conclusions about (upper-case) Causation precisely to support (lower-case) causal science. When critically examined, none of the standard New Humean arguments — familiar from the work of Wright, Craig, Strawson, Buckle, Kail, and others — retains any significant force against the plain evidence of Hume's; texts. But the most devastating objection comes from Hume's own applications of his analysis of causation, to the questions of ‘the immateriality of the soul’ and ‘liberty and necessity’. These show that the New Hume interpretation has misunderstood the entire purpose of his ‘Chief Argument’, and presented him as advocating some of the very positions he is arguing most strongly against
Keywords Hume  causation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/fzp095
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 61,109
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Language, Truth and Logic.A. J. Ayer - 1936 - London: V. Gollancz.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Paul Edwards (ed.) - 1967 - New York: Macmillan.

View all 64 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Hume's Fork, and His Theory of Relations.Peter Millican - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):3-65.
Hume's Scepticism and Realism.Jani Hakkarainen - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):283-309.
Type Distinctions of Reason and Hume’s Separability Principle.Hsueh Qu - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (1):90-111.
Hume’s Determinism.Peter Millican - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):611-642.

View all 22 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-10-10

Total views
203 ( #49,183 of 2,440,224 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #82,559 of 2,440,224 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes