Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):161-174 (2000)

Authors
Alexander B. Miller
The Catholic University of America
Abstract
Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'use-theoretic' account of meaning actually falls prey to that sceptical challenge. (publisher)
Keywords Disposition  Epistemology  Meaning  Kripke, S  Wittgenstein
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00177
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References found in this work BETA

Kripke’s Normativity Argument.José L. Zalabardo - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):467-488.
Meaning, Use and Truth.Paul Horwich - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):355-368.

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Citations of this work BETA

I—Meaning, Understanding and Normativity.Hannah Ginsborg - 2012 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):127-146.
Wittgensteinian content‐externalism.Ben Sorgiovanni - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):110-125.
Rule‐Following and Rule‐Breaking: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein.Daniel Watts - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy (4):1159-1185.
Demystifying Meaning.Guy Longworth - 2001 - Philosophical Papers 30 (2):145-167.

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