Philosophy of Science 67 (3):652 (2000)
We often legitimately ascribe reality both to social and to natural kinds. But the bases for these ascriptions are not entirely the same. In both cases, reality is typically determined by what characterizations of causal factors are indispensable to adequate explanation. Nonetheless, a psychological role as part of an identity that instances embrace is sometimes, distinctively, a condition for ascribing reality to a social kind. Although such assessments of reality can be construed as employing a standard of causal activity shared with natural science, they reveal a distinctive moral dimension in the bases for ascribing reality to social kinds
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Race, Kinds and Ontological Commitments: Issues for Social Policy Clarification.Steven I. Miller & Frank Perino - 2007 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (1):1–15.
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