Philosophical Issues 21 (1):332-351 (2011)
It is argued that seeing that P is a mode of knowing that P that is to be explained in terms of the exercise of visual-perceptual recognitional abilities. The nature of those abilities is described. The justification for believing that P, when one sees that P, is provided by the fact that one sees that P. Access to this fact is explained in terms of an ability to recognize of seen objects that one is seeing them. Reasons for resistance to such an account are considered. The distinction between merely reasonable belief and well-founded belief is emphasised
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References found in this work BETA
The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge.Alan Millar - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):1-19.
Scepticism, Perceptual Knowledge, and Doxastic Responsibility.Alan Millar - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):353-372.
I—Alan Millar: Why Knowledge Matters.Alan Millar - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):63-81.
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