David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Issues 21 (1):332-351 (2011)
It is argued that seeing that P is a mode of knowing that P that is to be explained in terms of the exercise of visual-perceptual recognitional abilities. The nature of those abilities is described. The justification for believing that P, when one sees that P, is provided by the fact that one sees that P. Access to this fact is explained in terms of an ability to recognize of seen objects that one is seeing them. Reasons for resistance to such an account are considered. The distinction between merely reasonable belief and well-founded belief is emphasised
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References found in this work BETA
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Duncan Pritchard (2010). The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. Oxford University Press.
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Wilfrid Sellars (1963). Science, Perception, and Reality. New York: Humanities Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Alan Millar (2014). Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):1-19.
Alan Millar (2011). Why Knowledge Matters. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):63-81.
Alan Millar (2012). Scepticism, Perceptual Knowledge, and Doxastic Responsibility. Synthese 189 (2):353-372.
Alan Millar (2011). I—Alan Millar: Why Knowledge Matters. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):63-81.
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