Thinking and Reasoning 18 (2):196 - 224 (2012)

Authors
Peter Milne
University of Stirling
Abstract
While there is now considerable experimental evidence that, on the one hand, participants assign to the indicative conditional as probability the conditional probability of consequent given antecedent and, on the other, they assign to the indicative conditional the ?defective truth-table? in which a conditional with false antecedent is deemed neither true nor false, these findings do not in themselves establish which multi-premise inferences involving conditionals participants endorse. A natural extension of the truth-table semantics pronounces as valid numerous inference patterns that do seem to be part of ordinary usage. However, coupled with something the probability account gives us?namely that when conditional-free ? entails conditional-free ?, ?if ? then ?? is a trivial, uninformative truth?we have enough logic to derive the paradoxes of material implication. It thus becomes a matter of some urgency to determine which inference patterns involving indicative conditionals participants do endorse. Only thus will we be able to arrive at a realistic, systematic semantics for the indicative conditional
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/13546783.2012.670754
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,586
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
Change in View.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.
Reasoning.Peter C. Wason - 1966 - In B. Foss (ed.), New Horizons in Psychology. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. pp. 135-151.

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Assertion.Peter Milne - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):331-349.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-05-22

Total views
77 ( #123,368 of 2,348,619 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #329,903 of 2,348,619 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes