Episteme 10 (2):117 - 134 (2013)
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Abstract |
People increasingly form beliefs based on information gained from automatically filtered Internet sources such as search engines. However, the workings of such sources are often opaque, preventing subjects from knowing whether the information provided is biased or incomplete. Users’ reliance on Internet technologies whose modes of operation are concealed from them raises serious concerns about the justificatory status of the beliefs they end up forming. Yet it is unclear how to address these concerns within standard theories of knowledge and justification. To shed light on the problem, we introduce a novel conceptual framework that clarifies the relations between justified belief, epistemic responsibility, action, and the technological resources available to a subject. We argue that justified belief is subject to certain epistemic responsibilities that accompany the subject’s particular decision-taking circumstances, and that one typical responsibility is to ascertain, so far as one can, whether the information upon which the judgment will rest is biased or incomplete. What this responsibility comprises is partly determined by the inquiry-enabling technologies available to the subject. We argue that a subject’s beliefs that are formed based on Internet-filtered information are less justified than they would be if she either knew how filtering worked or relied on additional sources, and that the subject may have the epistemic responsibility to take measures to enhance the justificatory status of such beliefs..
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Keywords | Knowledge Technology Epistemic Justification Epistemic Responsibility New Media Filtering |
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Reprint years | 2013 |
DOI | 10.1017/epi.2013.11 |
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References found in this work BETA
Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension.Andy Clark (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to the Actor-Network Theory.Bruno Latour - 2005 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the Debate.Brent Mittelstadt, Patrick Allo, Mariarosaria Taddeo, Sandra Wachter & Luciano Floridi - 2016 - Big Data and Society 3 (2).
Cognitive Islands and Runaway Echo Chambers: Problems for Epistemic Dependence on Experts.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2803-2821.
A Virtue Epistemology of the Internet: Search Engines, Intellectual Virtues and Education.Richard Heersmink - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (1):1-12.
View all 30 citations / Add more citations
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