Social Epistemology 29 (3):280-302 (2015)

Seumas Miller
Delft University of Technology
In this paper, I explore the relationship between joint epistemic action and collective moral responsibility. Here, we need to distinguish between the genus, joint action, and an important species of joint action which I introduced in some earlier work, namely, joint epistemic action. In the case of the latter, but not necessarily the former, participating agents have epistemic goals, e.g. the acquisition of knowledge. The notion of joint action per se is a familiar one in the philosophical literature, albeit I have provided, and defended, a particular analysis of it. However, the notion of joint epistemic action is a novel one. Nevertheless, I argue that it can be given the same kind of analysis as joint action which is not epistemic in character. The other key notion in play in this paper is that of collective moral responsibility. Over the last decade or two this notion has been receiving a good deal of attention in the philosophical literature. Two influential kinds of theory are non-individualist cor..
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DOI 10.1080/02691728.2014.971908
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References found in this work BETA

On Social Facts.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Ethics 102 (4):853-856.
Shared Cooperative Activity.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.
Knowledge and Evidence.Paul K. Moser - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Shared Epistemic Responsibility.Boyd Millar - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):493-506.
The Information Environment and Blameworthy Beliefs.Boyd Millar - 2019 - Social Epistemology 33 (6):525-537.

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