Journal of Philosophy of Education 41 (3):351–361 (2007)

Tony Milligan
University of Hertfordshire
In analytic moral philosophy it is standard to use unrealistic puzzles to set up moral dilemmas of a sort that I will call Lockean Puzzles. This paper will try to pinpoint just what is and what is not problematic about their use as a teaching tool or component part of philosophical arguments. I will try to flesh out the claim that what may be lost sight of in such Lockean puzzling is the personal dimension of moral deliberation—for example, moral problems differ from technical problems in the sense that they are non‐transferable, we cannot hand them over to others for solution.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9752.2007.00566.x
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Thought Experiments.Roy A. Sorensen - 1992 - Oxford University Press.

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