Ontological Arguments and the Superiority of Existence: Reply to Nagasawa

Mind 116 (464):1041-1054 (2007)

Peter Millican
Oxford University
Yujin Nagasawa accuses me of attributing to Anselm a principle (the 'principle of the superiority of existence', or PSE) which is not present in his text and which weakens, rather than strengthens, his Ontological Argument. I am undogmatic about the interpretative issue, but insist on a philosophical point: that Nagasawa's rejection of PSE does not help the argument, and appears to do so only because he overlooks the same ambiguity that vitiates the original. My conclusion therefore remains: that the fatal flaw in Anselm's argument—as in many other variants—is a relatively shallow ambiguity rather than a deep metaphysical mistake
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzm1041
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Millican on the Ontological Argument.Yujin Nagasawa - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):1027-1040.

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Is There a Shallow Logical Refutation of the Ontological Argument?Yujin Nagasawa - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (2):87--99.
On the PROVER9 Ontological Argument.T. Parent - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):475-483.

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