Philosophia Mathematica 15 (2):193-226 (2007)
Proofs of Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem are often accompanied by claims such as that the gödel sentence constructed in the course of the proof says of itself that it is unprovable and that it is true. The validity of such claims depends closely on how the sentence is constructed. Only by tightly constraining the means of construction can one obtain gödel sentences of which it is correct, without further ado, to say that they say of themselves that they are unprovable and that they are true; otherwise a false theory can yield false gödel sentences
|Keywords||Gödel sentences Journal Article Gödel, Kurt. Incompleteness theorem Gödel’s theorem Mathematics Philosophy|
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Self-Reference in Arithmetic I.Volker Halbach & Albert Visser - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (4):671-691.
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