The provision of public goods is generally assumed to require compulsion by the state. Individuals may want them, but they have no incentive to contribute voluntarily to their production. David Schmidtz proposes ?assurance contracts? as a way around the problem of ?wasted? contributions. However, such contracts do not eliminate the incentive to free ride on public goods. Empirical evidence suggests that enforced contributions may be a more effective way of combatting this problem than assurance contracts. More generally, we need to investigate different kinds of moral motivation to see how they may elicit voluntary contributions of public goods
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DOI 10.1080/08913819308443315
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The Possibility of Cooperation.Michael Taylor - 1987 - Cambridge University Press.

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