Physical probabilities

Synthese 73 (2):329 - 359 (1987)
A conception of probability as an irreducible feature of the physical world is outlined. Propensity analyses of probability are examined and rejected as both formally and conceptually inadequate. It is argued that probability is a non-dispositional property of trial-types; probabilities are attributed to outcomes as event-types. Brier's Rule in an objectivist guise is used to forge a connection between physical and subjective probabilities. In the light of this connection there are grounds for supposing physical probability to obey some standard set of axioms. However, there is no a priori reason why this should be the case.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00484746
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