In Michela Massimi & Ana-Maria Cretu (eds.), Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 87-106 (2020)

Jared A. Millson
California State University, Bakersfield
Kareem Khalifa
Middlebury College
Many epistemologists endorse true-belief monism, the thesis that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. However, this view faces formidable counterexamples. In response to these challenges, we alter the letter, but not the spirit, of true-belief monism. We dub the resulting view “inquisitive truth monism”, which holds that only true answers to relevant questions are of fundamental epistemic value. Which questions are relevant is a function of an inquirer’s perspective, which is characterized by his/her interests, social role, and background assumptions. Using examples of several different scientific practices, we argue that inquisitive truth monism outperforms true-belief monism.
Keywords questions  perspectivism  epistemic value  truth  scientific models  belief
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Erotetic Epistemic Logic.Michal Peliš - 2017 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 26 (3):357-381.
Good Questions.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2018 - In Jeffrey Dunn & Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford, UK: pp. 123-145.
Open Questions and Epistemic Necessity.Brett Sherman - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273):819-840.
The Untruth and the Truth of Skepticism.Panayot Butchvarov - 1994 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67 (4):41 - 61.
On Negative Yes/No Questions.Maribel Romero & Chung-Hye Han - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (5):609-658.
Idealizations and Understanding: Much Ado About Nothing?Emily Sullivan & Kareem Khalifa - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):673-689.
Are Epistemic Reasons Perspective-Dependent?Davide Fassio - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3253-3283.


Added to PP index

Total views
219 ( #43,710 of 2,433,434 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
41 ( #19,012 of 2,433,434 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes