Practical reasoning for serial hyperspecializers

Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):261-278 (2009)
Some species are weedy: they move from one ecological niche to another. Other species are specialized: they are exquisitely adapted to exploit a particular niche. Human beings are the design solution in which a species is simultaneously weedy and specialized - the trick being to manage the exquisite niche-specific adaptations in software rather than in the hardware. We are built to reprogram ourselves on the fly, to select new goals, new priorities and new guidelines appropriate to novel niches. Understanding ourselves as an implementation of this design solution has consequences for the theory of practical reasoning. Instrumentalism (the theory of practical reasoning according to which it consists solely in selecting means to pre-given ends) cannot be a suitable theory of rationality for such a species (that is, our own)
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2011
DOI 10.1080/13869790903067675
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,300
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Practical Induction.Elijah Millgram - 1997 - Harvard University Press.
Why Idealize?David Enoch - 2005 - Ethics 115 (4):759-787.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
28 ( #187,884 of 2,193,221 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #290,278 of 2,193,221 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature