Acta Analytica 30 (2):171-178 (2015)

It has recently been claimed that there is a “new hard problem” for physicalism. The new hard problem, according to Goff, is based on “semantic phenomenology”, the view that conscious perceptual experience represents linguistic expressions as having determinate meanings. Goff argues that Kripke’s rule-following argument demonstrates that it is particularly difficult for a physicalist to account for semantic phenomenology. In this paper, we argue that Goff’s discussion of semantic phenomenology fails to uncover a “new” hard problem for physicalism and there is a hard problem—which Goff misses—facing philosophers who accept the reality of semantic phenomenology, but that this is as much a problem for non-reductionists about meaning as it is for physicalists. All we have been given is a familiar hard problem about rule-following, not a new hard problem about consciousness
Keywords Physicalism  Rule-following  Consciousness  Kripke  Wittgenstein
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s12136-014-0237-5
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,355
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On The Infinitely Hard Problem Of Consciousness.Bernard Molyneux - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):211 - 228.
Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.
Real Acquaintance and Physicalism.Philip Goff - 2015 - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Beyond Physicalism.Daniel D. Hutto - 2000 - John Benjamins.
The Hard Problem: Closing the Empirical Gap.Jonathan Shear - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):54-68.
Mind the Gap.David Papineau - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:373-89.
The Philosophical Issue in Machine Consciousness.Piotr Boltuc - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):155-176.
Rethinking Nature: A Hard Problem Within the Hard Problem.Gregg H. Rosenberg - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):76-88.


Added to PP index

Total views
55 ( #208,325 of 2,519,575 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #205,550 of 2,519,575 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes