Rationality and Higher-Order Intentionality

Authors
Alan Millar
University of Stirling
Abstract
According to the rationality thesis, the possession of propositional attitudes is inextricably tied to rationality. How in this context should we conceive of rationality? In one sense, being rational is contrasted with being non-rational, as when human beings are described as rational animals. In another sense, being rational is contrasted with being irrational. I shall call rationality in this latter sense evaluative rationality. Whatever else it might involve, evaluative rationality surely has to do with satisfying requirements of rationality such as, presumably, the following: That one avoid inconsistency in beliefs. That one not adopt new beliefs unless what one knows entails or is evidence for the truth of those beliefs. That one not have φing as a goal yet do nothing necessary for one to φ.
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DOI 10.1017/S1358246100007165
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References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
Essays on Actions and Events.Donald Davidson - 1980 - Oxford University Press.

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