Sensory phenomenology and perceptual content

Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576 (2011)

Authors
Boyd Millar
Northern Illinois University
Abstract
The consensus in contemporary philosophy of mind is that how a perceptual experience represents the world to be is built into its sensory phenomenology. I defend an opposing view which I call ‘moderate separatism’, that an experience's sensory phenomenology does not determine how it represents the world to be. I argue for moderate separatism by pointing to two ordinary experiences which instantiate the same sensory phenomenology but differ with regard to their intentional content. Two experiences of an object reflected in a mirror can possess the same spatial phenomenology while representing that object to occupy different spatial locations. So, contrary to the current consensus, the representation of spatial location is not fixed by an experience's sensory phenomenology
Keywords Phenomenal Consciousness  Intentional Content  Perceptual Phenomenology  Sensory Qualities  Perception  Representationalism  Phenomenal Intentionality  Separatism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.696.x
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Colour Constancy and Fregean Representationalism.Boyd Millar - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):219-231.

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