Scotching the dutch book argument

Erkenntnis 32 (1):105--26 (1990)
Abstract
Consistent application of coherece arguments shows that fair betting quotients are subject to constraints that are too stringent to allow their identification with either degrees of belief or probabilities. The pivotal role of fair betting quotients in the Dutch Book Argument, which is said to demonstrate that a rational agent's degrees of belief are probabilities, is thus undermined from both sides.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00209558
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Scotching Dutch Books?Alan Hajek - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):139-151.

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