Authors
Boaz Miller
Zefat Academic College
Abstract
Philosophers have recently argued, against a prevailing orthodoxy, that standards of knowledge partly depend on a subject’s interests; the more is at stake for the subject, the less she is in a position to know. This view, which is dubbed “Pragmatic Encroachment” has historical and conceptual connections to arguments in philosophy of science against the received model of science as value free. I bring the two debates together. I argue that Pragmatic Encroachment and the model of value-laden science reinforce each other. Drawing on Douglas’ argument about the indispensability of value judgments in science, and psychological evidence about people’s inability to objectively reason about what they care about, I introduce a novel argument for Pragmatic Encroachment.
Keywords Science and values  Knowledge  Action  Subject-sensitive invariantism  Interest-relative invariantism  Intellectualism  Inductive risk
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s13194-014-0087-4
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal.Heather E. Douglas - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.

View all 52 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Is Technology Value-Neutral?Boaz Miller - 2021 - Science, Technology, and Human Values 46 (1):53-80.
The Information Environment and Blameworthy Beliefs.Boyd Millar - 2019 - Social Epistemology 33 (6):525-537.
John Dewey's Pragmatist Alternative to the Belief-Acceptance Dichotomy.Matthew J. Brown - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:62-70.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-03-16

Total views
562 ( #9,939 of 2,371,804 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
82 ( #7,246 of 2,371,804 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes