Science, values, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge

Authors
Boaz Miller
Zefat Academic College
Abstract
Philosophers have recently argued, against a prevailing orthodoxy, that standards of knowledge partly depend on a subject’s interests; the more is at stake for the subject, the less she is in a position to know. This view, which is dubbed “Pragmatic Encroachment” has historical and conceptual connections to arguments in philosophy of science against the received model of science as value free. I bring the two debates together. I argue that Pragmatic Encroachment and the model of value-laden science reinforce each other. Drawing on Douglas’ argument about the indispensability of value judgments in science, and psychological evidence about people’s inability to objectively reason about what they care about, I introduce a novel argument for Pragmatic Encroachment.
Keywords Science and values  Knowledge  Action  Subject-sensitive invariantism  Interest-relative invariantism  Intellectualism  Inductive risk
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DOI 10.1007/s13194-014-0087-4
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
The Fate of Knowledge.Helen Longino - 2002 - Princeton University Press.
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

John Dewey's Pragmatist Alternative to the Belief-Acceptance Dichotomy.Matthew J. Brown - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:62-70.

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