Authors
Kristie Miller
University of Sydney
Abstract
We direct different attitudes towards states of affairs depending on where in time those states of affairs are located. Call this the type asymmetry. The type asymmetry appears fitting. For instance, it seems fitting to feel guilt or regret only about states of affairs that are past, and anticipation only of states of affairs that are future. It has been argued that the type asymmetry could only be fitting if there are tensed facts, and hence that since it is fitting, there are tensed facts. In this paper I argue that tensed facts are not necessary to ground the fittingness of the type asymmetry, and thus we have no reason, arising from the fittingness of the asymmetry, to posit such facts. I also argue for a stronger conclusion: even if these facts obtain they are no part of what grounds the fittingness of the type asymmetry. These facts are explanatorily redundant.
Keywords time  tensed fact  A-theory  temporal passage  preference  time-bias  future-bias  decision  rationality
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
What Makes Time Special?Craig Callender - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
Objective Becoming.Bradford Skow - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
Real Time Ii.D. H. Mellor - 1998 - Routledge.

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