David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):309-334 (2006)
It is possible to wholly exist at multiple spatial locations at the same time. At least, if time travel is possible and objects endure, then such must be the case. To accommodate this possibility requires the introduction of a spatial analog of either relativising properties to times—relativising properties to spatial locations—or of relativising the manner of instantiation to times—relativising the manner of instantiation to spatial locations. It has been suggested, however, that introducing irreducibly spatially relativised or spatially adverbialised properties presents some difficulties for the endurantist. I will consider an objection according to which embracing such spatially relativised properties could lead us to reject mereology altogether in favour of a metaphysics according to which objects are wholly present at every space-time point at which they exist. I argue that although such a view is coherent, there are some good reasons to reject it. Moreover, I argue that the endurantist can introduce spatially relativised or adverbialised properties without conceding that objects lack spatial parts. Such a strategy has the additional advantage that it allows the endurantist not only to explain time travel, but also to reconcile our competing intuitions about cases of fission.
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1976). The Paradoxes of Time Travel. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):145-152.
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Citations of this work BETA
Cody Gilmore (2008). Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1224-1254.
Heather Demarest (2016). Fission May Kill You. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):565-582.
John W. Carroll (2011). Self Visitation, Traveler Time, and Compatible Properties. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):359-370.
Nikk Effingham (2011). Temporal Parts and Time Travel. Erkenntnis 74 (2):225-240.
John W. Carroll (2016). Ways to Commit Autoinfanticide. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):180--191.
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