Travelling in time: How to wholly exist in two places at the same time

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):309-334 (2006)
Abstract
It is possible to wholly exist at multiple spatial locations at the same time. At least, if time travel is possible and objects endure, then such must be the case. To accommodate this possibility requires the introduction of a spatial analog of either relativising properties to times—relativising properties to spatial locations—or of relativising the manner of instantiation to times—relativising the manner of instantiation to spatial locations. It has been suggested, however, that introducing irreducibly spatially relativised or spatially adverbialised properties presents some difficulties for the endurantist. I will consider an objection according to which embracing such spatially relativised properties could lead us to reject mereology altogether in favour of a metaphysics according to which objects are wholly present at every space-time point at which they exist. I argue that although such a view is coherent, there are some good reasons to reject it. Moreover, I argue that the endurantist can introduce spatially relativised or adverbialised properties without conceding that objects lack spatial parts. Such a strategy has the additional advantage that it allows the endurantist not only to explain time travel, but also to reconcile our competing intuitions about cases of fission.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0045-5091
DOI 10.1353/cjp.2006.0019
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References found in this work BETA
The Paradoxes of Time Travel.David Lewis - 1976 - American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):145-152.
The Statue and the Clay.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1998 - Noûs 32 (2):149-173.
Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics.Sally Haslanger - 1989 - Analysis 49 (3):119-125.
Constitution is Not Identity.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):89-106.

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Citations of this work BETA
Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime.Cody Gilmore - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1224-1254.
Fission May Kill You.Heather Demarest - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):565-582.
Self Visitation, Traveler Time, and Compatible Properties.John W. Carroll - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):359-370.
Temporal Parts and Time Travel.Nikk Effingham - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (2):225-240.
Ways to Commit Autoinfanticide.John W. Carroll - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):180--191.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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