Authors
Alan Millar
University of Stirling
Abstract
In a discussion of rule-following inspired by Wittgenstein, Kripke asks us to consider the relation which holds between meaning plus by ‘+’ and answering questions like, ‘What is the sum of 68 and 57?’. A dispositional theory has it that if you mean plus by ‘+’ then you will probably answer, ‘125’. That is because, according to such a theory, to mean plus by ‘+’ is, roughly speaking, to be disposed, by and large, and among other things, to answer such questions with the correct sum. Kripke wants to emphasize, by contrast, that if you mean plus by ‘+’ then, faced with the question, ‘What is 68 + 57?’ you ought to answer, ‘125’. One could sum up the assumption about meaning which appears to underpin this criticism of dispositional theories in terms of the slogan that meaning is normative. Allan Gibbard gives us a way of reading that slogan which is suggested by Kripke's brief remarks:The crux of the slogan that meaning is normative … might be another slogan: that means implies ought. To use roughly Kripke's example, from statements saying what I mean by the plus sign and other arithmetic terms and constructions, it will follow that I ought to answer ‘7’ when asked ‘What's 5 + 2?’.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s1358246100008080
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,448
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Paul Horwich - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (1):163-171.
Wittgenstein on Following a Rule.John McDowell - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):325-364.
Meaning and Normativity.Allan Gibbard - 1994 - Philosophical Issues 5:95-115.
A Guide to Naturalizing Semantics.Barry M. Loewer - 1997 - In C. Wright & Bob Hale (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell: Oxford. pp. 108-126.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Metaethics After Moore.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Normativity of Meaning and Content.Kathrin Glüer & Asa Wikforss - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Moore on the Right, the Good, and Uncertainty.Michael Smith - 2006 - In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press. pp. 2006--133.
On Epistemic Conceptions of Meaning: Use, Meaning and Normativity.Daniel Whiting - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):416-434.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Meaning and Normativity.Allan Gibbard - 1994 - Philosophical Issues 5:95-115.
On Epistemic Conceptions of Meaning: Use, Meaning and Normativity.Daniel Whiting - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):416-434.
Über Die Sogenannte Normativität der Bedeutung.Adolf Rami - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1):81-117.
Free Content Über Die Sogenannte Normativität Der Bedeutung.Adolf Rami - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1):81-117.
The Normativity of Meaning.Eric H. Gampel - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 86 (3):221-42.
Is Meaning Normative?Andrea Guardo - 2010 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophy of Language and Linguistics. Frankfurt: Ontos. pp. 55-63.
The Normativity of Meaning.Alan Millar - 2002 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Philosophical Studies. Cambridge University Press. pp. 57-73.
Meaning Skepticism and Normativity.Martin Montminy - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:215-235.
The Normativity of Meaning: Guidance and Justification.Matthew Jones - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):425-443.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-06-30

Total views
22 ( #491,031 of 2,445,956 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #232,113 of 2,445,956 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes