The policy-based approach to identification

Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):105 – 125 (2007)
In a number of recent papers, Michael Bratman has defended a policy-based theory of identification which represents the most sophisticated and compelling development of a broadly hierarchical approach to the problems about identification which Harry Frankfurt drew our attention to over thirty years ago. Here I first summarize the bare essentials of Bratman's view, and then raise doubts about both its necessity and sufficiency. Finally I consider his objections to rival value-based models, and find those objections to be less compelling than he makes them out to be.
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DOI 10.1080/09515080601096705
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References found in this work BETA
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
The Reasons of Love.Harry G. Frankfurt - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):463-475.

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Citations of this work BETA
Identifying with Our Desires.Christian Miller - 2013 - Theoria 79 (2):127-154.
Motivation in Agents.Christian Miller - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):222–266.

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