Journal of Applied Philosophy 39 (2):266-281 (2022)
AbstractBrain-computer interfaces (BCIs) are devices primarily intended to allow agents to use prosthetic body parts, wheelchairs, and other mechanisms by forming intentions or performing certain mental actions. In this paper I illustrate how the use of BCIs leads to two unique and unrecognized problems of moral luck. In short, it seems that agents who depend upon BCIs for bodily movement or the use of other mechanisms (henceforth “BCI-agents”) may end up deserving of blame and legal punishment more so than standard counterparts simply due to factors beyond their control. My aim is to explore whether we can avoid the implication that BCI-agents are subject to these unique sources of moral luck. In doing so I offer a number of possible solutions and then defend one of these solutions as the best. As it turns out, the solution I defend addresses both problems of moral luck at once and has broader implications for theorizing about moral luck as well as the epistemic condition on moral responsibility.
Similar books and articles
BCI-Mediated Behavior, Moral Luck, and Punishment.Daniel J. Miller - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 11 (1):72-74.
Moral Luck and Computer Ethics: Gauguin in Cyberspace. [REVIEW]David Sanford Horner - 2010 - Ethics and Information Technology 12 (4):299-312.
Committing Crimes with BCIs: How Brain-Computer Interface Users Can Satisfy Actus Reus and Be Criminally Responsible.Kramer Thompson - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (S3):311-322.
Beyond the Responsibility Gap. Discussion Note on Responsibility and Liability in the Use of Brain-Computer Interfaces.Gerd Grübler - 2011 - AI and Society 26 (4):377-382.
How to Apply Molinism to the Theological Problem of Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2014 - Faith and Philosophy 31 (1):68-90.
The Mind and the Machine. On the Conceptual and Moral Implications of Brain-Machine Interaction.Maartje Schermer - 2009 - NanoEthics 3 (3):217-230.
A Defense of the Luck Pincer: Why Luck (Still) Undermines Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2019 - Journel of Information Ethic 28 (1):51-72.
Free Will and Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - forthcoming - In Joseph Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), A Companion to Free Will.
Moral Luck and Moral Performance.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):1017-1028.
Editorial: Moral Luck, Social Networking Sites, and Trust on the Web. [REVIEW]Maria C. Bottis, Frances S. Grodzinsky & Herman T. Tavani - 2010 - Ethics and Information Technology 12 (4):297-298.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
No citations found.
References found in this work
In Defense of Moral Luck: Why Luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness.Robert J. Hartman - 2017 - Routledge.
Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gideon Rosen - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):295–313.
Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (1):115-152.